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Over the last few years, many studies have shown that social networks affect the 
socioeconomic development. This paper presents evidence, through the Italian 
microdata representative of the entire Italian population, that the quality and quantity of 
interpersonal relations of agents can increase their economic welfare. Two proxies of 
interpersonal relations at an individual level are considered: a proxy for the density and 
one for the quality of network structure of personal contacts. Both seem to have a 
positive effect on the level of household economic welfare of agents. This result proves 
robust to the inclusion of a variety of control variables and to the use of different 
econometric methods. 
 
Keywords: Networks, Social Interactions, Household Economic Welfare, Microdata, 
Fuzzy Logic 
 
JEL Classification: D10, Z13 
 
I am deeply indebted to Paolo Vanin and Giovanni Verga for their accurate and 
precious notes and suggestions. The paper benefited also from comments by 
participants at the Second Workshop on Civil Economy organized by the University of 













Address for correspondence: 
 
Giacomo Degli Antoni 
EconomEtica - Inter-University Centre for Economic Ethics  
and Corporate Social Responsibility 
University of Milano-Bicocca 
Via dell’Innovazione 10 
20126 Milan 
Italy 
E-mail: giacomo.degliantoni@unimib.it   2 
1.  Introduction 
 
Recently, many studies have devoted more and more attention to the investigation on the 
effects that interpersonal relations have on economic variables. In particular, they are interested 
in the relationship between: social relations and economic growth (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997; 
and Zak and Knack 2001); social relations and government performance (e.g. Putnam 1993; 
Easterly and Levine 1997; Hall and Jones 1999; and La Porta et al. 1999); social relations and 
human  capital  (e.g.  Loury  1977;  Coleman  1988;  Goldin  and Katz 1999; and  Helliwell  and 
Putnam  1999);  and  social  relations  and  financial  development  (e.g.  Guiso,  Sapienza  and 
Zingales 2004). With regard to this paper, in particular, it is worth stressing that there are many 
contributions showing a significant correlation between economic performance and different 
characteristics of social networks.  
At an aggregate level, for example, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) 
find that the level of trust present in a country and its economic performance are positively 
associated.  Narayan  and  Pritchett  (1999)  show  that  the  level  of  social  capital
1  present  in 
different  Tanzanian  villages  positively  influences  household  wealth.    Helliwell  and  Putnam 
(1995) and Lyon (2005) find that growth in per capita income in Italy is positively associated 
with an index of civic community which is measured by considering: Referendum Turnouts 
(1974-1987),  Preference  Voting  (1953-1979),  Newspaper  Readership  (%;  1975)  and 
Association  Density  (1981).  Granovetter  (2005)  analyses  the  impact  of  social  networks  on 
economic outcomes. He stresses that social structure affects economic outputs for three main 
reasons:  “First,  social  networks  affect  the  flow  and  the  quality  of  information.  Much 
information  is  subtle,  nuanced  and  difficult  to  verify,  so  actors  do  not  believe  impersonal 
sources and instead rely on people they know. Second, social networks are an important source 
of reward and punishment, since these are often magnified in their impact when coming from 
others personally known. Third, trust, by which I mean the confidence that others will do the 
“right” thing despite a clear balance of incentives to the contrary, emerges, if it does, in the 
context of a social network.” (Granovetter, 2005, p.33) 
At a micro level, many contributions have shown that social relations of individuals affect 
the  possibility  of  increasing  personal  income.  Granovetter  (1974)  focuses  on  the  role  that 
“Personal contacts” have on getting a job. Granovetter defines personal contacts as “individual 
known  personally  to  the  respondent
2,  with  whom he  originally  became  acquainted in some 
context unrelated to a search for job information, from whom he has found out about his new 
job, or, who recommended to someone who then contacted him” (Granovetter, 1974, p.11). The 
author  finds  evidence  that  personal  contacts  are  the  main  channel  through  which  the 
unemployed get a job. Moreover, jobs found through personal contacts have higher wages than 
                                                
1 The concept of social capital is often used by economists in order to analyse the role of interpersonal 
relations in economics. There are many definitions of social capital and it is possible to identify two 
principal approaches  to  this  concept.  The  first  one  considers  social  capital  as  a  variable that  mostly 
produces  effects  and  is  developed  at  an  aggregate  level.  Putnam  (1993),  Fukuyama  (1995,  1999), 
Narayan and Pritchett (1999), Uphoff (2000), Paldam and Svendsen (2000), the World Bank (2005) are 
exponents of this approach. The second one considers social capital at an individual level. The authors 
adopting this approach interpret social capital as a notion that operates at an individual level. Coleman 
(1988, 1990), DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2000), Glaeser, Laibson, 
Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) use this approach. The aim of this paper is not to investigate the concept 
of social capital and its features (for a discussion of social capital and its features see, for example, 
Paldam 2000; Woolcock e Narayan 2000; Durlauf e Fafchamps 2004). However, it is useful for the 
purposes of this work to refer sometimes to this notion. In these cases, the definitions of social capital 
used will always be specified. Narayan and Pritchett define social capital as the “quantity and quality of 
associational life and the related social norms” (Narayan and Pritchett 1999, p.872). 
2 In the study of Granovetter (1974), the respondents are workers who have found a job in the last five 
years.   3 
jobs  found  by  “Formal  means”  (advertisements,  public  and  private  employment  agencies, 
interviews etc.) or “Direct applications” (when one goes directly to the firm without using a 
formal  or  personal  intermediary).  Grootaert  (1999),  Grootaert  and  Narayan  (1999)  and 
Grootaert, Oh and Swamy (1999) investigate the effect that the participation in local institutions
 
has on the household welfare respectively in Indonesia, Bolivia and Burkina Faso. These three 
papers show that the participation in local associations reduces household poverty. The more 
household is involved in local associations, the higher the per capita household expenditures are 
and the better the access to credit of household is. Rose (1999) produces an empirical analysis 
of Russia and shows that social networks positively affect individual welfare. Three aspects of 
individual welfare are considered by the author: a measure of food consumption, a measure of 
income security and a proxy of health. Individual welfare is studied in relation to three groups 
of independent variables: individual attributes, social integration and generic social capital. The 
social capital measures, in particular, include different kinds of social networks that individuals 
can  rely  upon  and  that  result  positively  correlated  to  individual  welfare.  Glaeser,  Laibson, 
Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) use an experimental framework and investigate the individual 
determinants of trust and trustworthiness. They find, in a “trust game” design, that the family 
status (measured by the number of hours spent working for pay, which is a negative indicator of 
status, and by having a father that has a college degree) and charisma (measured by the number 
of beers drunk per week and by the presence of a sexual partner) affects the amount of pay-off 
gained by the agents in the trust game. The authors interpret status and charisma as components 
of “individual social capital” that reflect the ability to gain return from social situations. People 
with high level of individual social capital have more possibilities to reward and punish others 
and  are  more  able  to  induce  trustworthy  behaviour.  According  to  the  “social  capital  of 
brokerage” idea of Burt (1992, 2002), people who are involved in networks that bridge the 
structural  hole  between  groups  have  advantages  in  getting  information  and  in  pursuing 
rewarding opportunities. Burt shows that  managers (Burt 2004) and bankers (Burt 2003) who 
are connected to different groups of individuals that share alternative ideas and ways of thinking 
are  more  able  to  get  individual  advantages  such  as  higher  salary,  positive  performance 
evaluations, positive peer evaluations, promotions and good ideas.  
This paper follows a microeconomic approach and investigates, using Italian microdata, the 
effects of the social structure of personal contacts on household economic welfare. The main 
contributions of this paper in relation to the previous literature are two. The first one is related 
to  the  data  used  for  the  empirical  work.  The  data  are  representative  for  the  entire  Italian 
population. The use of national-level data bases is quite rare in this kind of study. The second 
contribution is related to one of the proxies of social relations used in the empirical analysis. 
Two  proxies are considered. They  reveal  information about  the quality  and  the  quantity of 
interpersonal  relations  that  characterize  the  social  life  of  individual  agents.  The  proxy 
constructed  in  order  to  capture  the  quality  of  the  network  structure  of  personal  contacts 
introduces original elements in the literature. This proxy reflects the satisfaction of agents in 
social relations whereas the socio-economic literature that analyses at a micro level the effects 
of  the  social  network  on  economic  outputs  usually  consider  proxies  of  the  density  of 
interpersonal relations. The proxy of the quality of social networks is constructed by using a 
survey question with regards to the satisfaction of relationships with friends. In order to study 
the effects of social relations on economic welfare it is not important just the number of social 
relations that an individual has. What really matters is that the network is characterized by 
relations  based  on  trust  and  trustworthiness.  Only  these  kinds  of  relations  are  a  capital  for 
individuals. The proxy elaborated by measuring the satisfaction of relationships with friends 
allows us to focus on the importance of the qualitative characteristics of social networks in 
affecting individual economic welfare. The empirical evidence of this paper stresses that in 
order to study the effects of social networks on personal economic welfare it is not possible to 
neglect a direct consideration of the qualitative aspect of individual social relations. Both the   4 
density and the quality of the social structure of personal relations are simultaneously effective 
on the possibility of agents to increase their economic welfare. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the variables and the methodology 
used  in  the  empirical  analysis.  Section  3  displays  the  basic  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS) 
regressions, testing the relations between social ties and household economic welfare, and the 
sensitivity analysis. Section 4 concludes. Appendix 1 presents the summary statistics. Appendix 
2 shows the empirical results obtained by investigating the same relations studied in section 3, 
but using the discriminant analysis. It is useful to verify if the procedure adopted to create the 
dependent variables used in the OLS analysis has produced some effective distortions in these 
ones and in the OLS estimation. Appendix 3 describes the questions used in order to construct 
the economic welfare indices and the independent variables. 
 
2. Social relations and economic welfare: data and methodological issues  
 
The data considered in this paper are from the “Indagine Multiscopo sulle Famiglie-Aspetti 
della Vita Quotidiana”, a research published yearly from 1993 by ISTAT (The Italian National 
Institute  of  Statistics). In particular, the present  analysis  uses  the  microdata relating  to two 
different years: 1993 and 2001. In these two years, the surveys examined 19.748 and 19.920 
households and 55.844 and 53.113 individuals respectively.  
The  principal  goal  of  the  empirical  analysis  is  to  investigate  the  relationship  between 
household economic welfare and the interpersonal relations of head of family (data collected in 
the ISTAT’s databases refer to social relations of head of familiy).   
Two aspects of social relations are separately considered in this paper: the quantitative and 
the qualitative one. The quantitative aspect of social relations is measured by considering the 
relationships that agents form inside some particular types of formal institutions: the voluntary 
associations. The qualitative aspect is elaborated by considering the satisfaction in relationships 
with friends. One can imagine that these two aspects of social relations are positively correlated 
and this is true for the proxies considered in this paper (the correlation is equal to about 64%). If 
an individual decides to maintain and extend his/her social network, it is possible to imagine 
that he is satisfied with his/her social relations
3. However, the distinction between these two 
aspects of social relations seem to be significant to understand the economic effects of all the 
different social behaviours of agents. This idea seems to be correct if we consider that both the 
proxy of quantitative social relations and the proxy of qualitative social relations are significant, 
if introduced in the same regression, to explain the role of social ties to increase the household 
economic welfare (Section 3).  
The proxy of the quantitative aspect of social ties is an indicator of social participation. It 
reflects the propensity of individuals to participate in different groups. It is named membership 
and reflects the propensity of single agents to participate in “Putnam associations”
4. Three types 
of groups are considered: 
                                                
3 Probably, this is due to the role of social skills of individuals that can affect both the ability to create and 
maintain social relations and the ability to cultivate these in a satisfactory way. 
4 Olson (1982) and Putnam (1993) offer two different explanations of the impact of private associations 
on economic growth and on social cohesion. Olson stresses some negative effects of associations. He 
argues that private associations pursue the special interests of its members and, for this reason, generate 
social costs and reduce social cohesion. In particular, this is a consequence of the fact that only the 
smaller associations emerge in the society and the small associations defend special interests of small 
groups. On the contrary, larger  organizations, representing the interests  of numerous  individuals, are 
inefficient because they  present  many  coordination problems and they cannot emerge in the society. 
Putnam emphasizes the propensity of groups to generate trust, social ties and civicness among people. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) and Knack (2003) investigate, at an empirical level, the different hypotheses of 
Olson and Putnam. Knack and Keefer (1997) and Knack (2003) consider the different characteristics of 
groups and distinguish between “Putnam” associations (education, arts, music or cultural activities; local   5 
•  cultural associations 
•  volunteer organizations 
•  ecological, human rights and peace associations. 
This proxy has been computed by calculating the arithmetic mean of the number of associations 
the head of the family joined over the last year (Appendix 3).  
The proxy of the qualitative aspect of social ties, named satisfaction, reflects the satisfaction 
of the head of family in interpersonal relations. It is constructed by using a survey question with 
regard to satisfaction of relationships with friends. The available responses to this question are: 
“not satisfied with the relationships with friends”, “not very satisfied”, “somewhat satisfied” 
and  “very  satisfied”  (Appendix  3).  This  index  of  satisfaction  of  relationships  with  friends 
appears very useful in illustrating the quality of interpersonal relations characterizing the social 
life of agents. Not all the encounters among agents produce “positive relational outputs” such as 
mutual trust, closeness and reciprocal respect (Gui 2002)
5. An encounter can generate “negative 
relational outputs” too, such as, among others, rancour and hatred. The proxy of satisfaction 
with social ties above described enables us to understand if the interpersonal relations of agents 
produce mostly positive or negative outputs and, consequently, if the social networks of agents 
are  characterized  by  ties  the  agents  can  effectively  rely  upon.  Essentially,  it  allows  us  to 
understand  the  role  of  qualitative  characteristics  in  making  social  relations  a  capital  that 
individuals can use to increase their economic welfare. Individuals can take more advantage 
from the social network if this network is characterized by relations based on trust and the more 
one is satisfied with social relations, the more it is likely that these relations link people who 
trust each other. 
Both  the  proxies  of  social  ties  described  are  analysed  in  association  with  household 
economic welfare. Since there is not a direct measure of household income or household wealth 
in the data collected in the “Indagine Multiscopo”, two different household economic welfare 
indices have been elaborated using these data. These two indices present different information 
about  household  economic  welfare.  The  first  one  can  be  considered  a  Subjective  index  of 
Economic Welfare (hereafter also SEW) and the second one an Objective index of Economic 
Welfare (hereafter also OEW).  
The SEW has been elaborated by standardizing and calculating the average of the values 
related to: 
•  the responses of head of family about the general economic situation of the family 
•  the responses of head of family about financial difficulties to meet some expenditures.  
(See appendix 3 for the specific questions used to calculate this index) 
The  responses  of  head  of  family  about  the  general  economic  situation  essentially  reflect 
subjective considerations. They reveal satisfaction with regard to the economic situation of the 
family. This satisfaction depends mostly on personal expectations and on the consideration of 
the relative situation of each household group in respect to other ones belonging to the same 
social class. Similar considerations are valid for the responses about financial difficulties in 
meeting  various  expenditures.  These  responses  can  be  determined  by  objective  economic 
                                                                                                                                          
community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality; youth work, e.g. scouts, 
guides,  youth  clubs,  etc.;  sports  or  recreation  associations)  and  “Olson”  associations  (professional 
associations; trade unions; political parties or groups). The associations considered in this paper to study 
the impact of social relations on economic welfare are identified as Putnam association following the 
criteria used by these authors. 
5 This concept of positive relational outputs is very close to the notion of relational goods developed by 
Gui (2002). Gui stresses that each economic transaction among agents produces different outputs. These 
outputs are for example: the exchange of economic goods, contract supplies, the variation of the human 
capital of agents involved in the transaction and the production of relational goods. Relational goods are 
the emotional effects of the transactions such as the feeling between agents and the pleasure that they 
have in communicating.    6 
difficulties, but the perception of difficulties depends also on the comparison between one’s 
budgetary constraint and one’s desired level of expenditure. This is a subjective element that 
plays an important role in this analysis. For these reasons, the SEW seems to be an index that 
mainly reflects subjective considerations on household economic welfare. 
The OEW has been elaborated by standardizing and calculating the average of the values 
related to: 
•  the possession of some durable consumer goods 
•  the characteristics of the physical structure of house. 
(See appendix 3 for the specific questions used to calculate this index) 
Both these aspects do not reflect subjective considerations. The head of family simply lists a 
series of durable consumer goods and some characteristics of the physical structure of house.  
In  order  to  verify  the  reliability  of  these  two  economic  welfare  indices,  it  has  been 
elaborated a measure both of SEW and of OEW at regional level and this measure has been 
related to the regional per capita GDP. The correlations between the SEW and the regional per 
capita GDP is equal to about 83%, the correlations between the OEW and the regional per 
capita GDP is equal to about 65%. 
The SEW and the OEW are the dependent variables in the empirical analysis and have been 
calculated with reference to the year 2001.  
Conversely, the independent variables, the two indices of social relations and a variable 
named education that reflects the educational qualification of agents (Appendix 3) have been 
calculated  with  reference  to  the  year  1993
6.  This  allows  us  to  minimize  the  endogeneity 
problems. 
Since the sample has changed over the two considered years, it was not possible to directly 
associate  the  variables  related  to  the  heads  of  the  families  with  reference  to  1993  and  the 
economic welfare indices of 2001. For this reason, with regard to the age and the region of the 
heads  of  the  families,  different  groups  of  the  heads  of  the  families  (and  of  their  relative 
household group) were created, both referring to 1993 and 2001. There are 247 groups for each 
year. The 247 groups were derived by a grouping based on 19 regions
7 and 13 age brackets (the 
age brackets range 5 years and include the heads of families from 23 to 87 years old). The 
groups comprise an average of 75 observations. Groups including the heads of the families who 
are from 18 to 23 years old and above 87 years old were excluded due to insufficient data. 
Because 21 groups included in the 247 analysed comprise less than 20 observations, all the 
equations that are proposed in the next section have been newly calculated using only groups 
larger than 20 observations. The results do not change in the two different analyses. For each 
dependent and independent variable the arithmetic mean of the standardized values associated to 
each individual was calculated with reference to each group and the regressions were conducted 
based on these means. Because of that, the variables used in the empirical analysis are no longer 
categorical variables, but continuous ones.   
Section 3 displays the results of the empirical analysis conducted using the OLS method. In 
particular, section 3.1 presents the empirical results with reference to the associations between 
subjective household economic welfare index and social relations. Section 3.2 shows the results 
regarding  the  relationships  between  interpersonal  relations  and  the  objective  household 
economic  welfare  index.  Section  3.3 presents  the  sensitivity  analysis  conducted introducing 
changes in terms of control variables in the OLS estimations presented in sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
The dependent variables considered in the OLS estimations have been calculated aggregating 
ordinal data derived by survey questions. In order to further prove the robustness of the OLS 
results  other  two  dependent  variables  have  been  constructed  using  a  different  aggregation 
                                                
6 Other explanatory variables, used in the sensitivity analysis, are introduced subsequently. Summary 
statistics of all the variables used in the analysis are presented in Appendix 1. 
7 There are 20 Italian regions, but Valle d’Aosta and Piemonte are considered together in the “Indagine 
Multiscopo”.   7 
method. Instead of calculating the arithmetic mean, the individual data derived from questions 
on the economic situation of families have been added. The household economic welfare indices 
obtained  are  categorical  variables  instead  of  continuous  ones.  These  categorical  dependent 
variables have been studied using the discriminant analysis that essentially confirms the results 
of the OLS regressions. Appendix 2 shows the result of the discriminant analysis.  
 
3. Social relations and household economic welfare 
 
3.1.Social relations and the subjective household economic welfare index 
 
Table  1  presents  the  results  of  the  regression  in  which  the  dependent  variable  is  the 
subjective household economic welfare index and the independent variables are: membership, 
satisfaction and education.  
 
Tab. 1 Social relations and the subjective economic welfare (OLS) 
 
Dependent variable: the subjective economic welfare index  
 




0.645  0.028  23.285  0.000 
Membership 
 
0.172  0.052  3.289  0.001 
Satisfaction 
 
0.037  0.010  3.611  0.000 
Education 
 
-0.004  0.002  -1.829  0.069 
R-squared  0.147  Mean dependent var  0.751 
 
Adj. R-squared  0.136  S.D. dependent var  0.027 
S.E. of 
regression 
0.025  Akaike info criterion  -4.500 
Sum squared 
resid. 
0.156  Schwarz criterion  -4.443 
Log likelihood  559.772  F-statistic  13.910 
 
    Prob(F-statistic)  0.000 
 
Sample size is 247 
 
The R
2 of regression is equal to 13.6%. There is a correlation between all the regressors and the 
subjective index of economic welfare (SEW). The individuals showing a greater propensity to 
participate in Putnam associations and those that are more satisfied with their relations with 
friends,  present  a  higher  subjective  household  economic  welfare.  The  relation  between 
educational  qualification  and  the  subjective  household  economic  welfare  is  negative  and 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. While the educational qualification increases, the 
SEW decreases. This is an interesting conclusion if one considers that some studies show a 
negative correlation between human capital and the satisfaction of individuals with reference to 
different variables. Clark and Oswald (1996), for example, using British data, show a negative 
association between education rate and job satisfaction. More in general, over the last few years,   8 
many contributions have shown that the satisfaction of individuals with regard to their income 
or consumption is not  determined  only by the  absolute level of these  variables.  Two other 
factors  would  contribute  to  increase  individual  satisfaction  with  reference  to  economic 
condition.  
First, it is currently accepted that the satisfaction of agents depends also on the comparison 
between the individual level of income and/or consumption and the level of income  and/or 
consumption reached by others. In this context, a pioneer research was carried out by Hirsch 
(1976). He argues that after a society has completely and widely satisfied primary needs it turns 
to the satisfaction of positional and relational needs. Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) show that 
the choice of women to work depends on the comparison between their individual household 
income and the income of household that are included in their social class. Corneo and Jeanne 
(1999) show that the wish to reach a high social status is an incentive to accumulate wealth and, 
for this reason, it can foster economic growth. Clark and Oswald (1996) and Clark (1997) find 
that the relative income matters for job satisfaction. Luttmer (2005) shows that, controlling for 
individual and local characteristics, higher earnings of neighbours are correlated to lower levels 
of self-reported happiness. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) finds that “the larger an individual’s own 
income is in comparison with the income of the reference group, the happier the individual is” 
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, p.1015) 
Second, personal expectations with regard to the possibility of reaching some results (in 
terms of income, consumption etc.) seems to be relevant to individual satisfaction. Clark (1997) 
finds that women consistently have higher job satisfaction than men even if the women’s job is 
less paid and is worse in terms of hiring, job content and promotion opportunities. Clark argues 
that “The resolution of this paradox is suggested to lie in the importance of expectations in well-
being: those who expected less from working will be more satisfied with any given job” (Clark 
1997, p.342). Sacco and Vanin (2000) consider a simulation model of network interaction and 
show that aspirations are a key factor in generating satisfaction. Stutzer (2004) investigates the 
effect of income aspiration on agents’ utility. The empirical results show that higher income 
aspirations reduce satisfaction with life. The existing literature seems to support the idea that 
two individuals with the same level of income but with different personal expectations could 
have different satisfaction with their situations. As Clark and Oswald (1996) argue in order to 
explain the negative correlation between the education rate and job satisfaction, it is plausible 
that a higher level of educational qualification corresponds to higher personal aspirations. A 
higher level of educational qualification corresponds to a larger investment in education. Larger 
investments are justified by the expectations of greater income in the future. This could explain 
the negative correlation between the SEW and the educational qualification shown in table 1.  
As it will be shown in the next section, the correlation between the objective household 
economic welfare and the educational qualification is positive. It means that the heads of the 
families with higher education in effect reach higher level of objective economic welfare but 
they  are  less  satisfied  with  their  welfare.  The  negative  association  between  the  educational 
qualification and the subjective household economic welfare seems to be the principal result of 
the regression presented in table 1. In fact, it is important to stress the positive  correlation 
between the level of individual interpersonal relations and the SEW. Nevertheless, the particular 
character of the dependent variable makes it difficult to interpret the correlations between the 
indices  of  social  relations  and  the  subjective  household  economic  welfare.  In  order  to 
understand if economic relations are effective in the creation of economic outputs, it is better to 
analyse  the  relationships  between  the  two  variables:  membership  and  satisfaction  and  the 




   9 
3.2.Social relations and the objective household economic welfare index 
 
In this section, the empirical relationships between the social ties characterizing the social 
life of heads of families and the level of the objective household economic welfare (OEW) is 
analysed. Table 2 presents the results of the regression estimated using the OLS. These results 
show a positive and statistically significant association between the three independent variables 
and the OEW. However, in this case, the OLS method does not appear appropriate because the 
Ramsey RESET test reveals that the relation estimated in table 2 is not correctly specified and 
that there are some non linear relations between the independent variables and the dependent 
ones.  
 
Tab.2 Social relations and the objective economic welfare (OLS) 
 
Dependent variable: the objective economic welfare index  
 




0.089  0.055  1.622  0.106 
Membership 
 
0.493  0.103  4.780  0.000 
Satisfaction 
 
0.083  0.020  4.117  0.000 
Education 
 
0.030  0.005  6.199  0.000 
R-squared 
 
0.542  Mean dependent var  0.489 
Adj. R-squared  0.536  S.D. dependent var  0.073 
S.E.  of 
regression 
0.050  Akaike info criterion  -3.141 
Sum  squared 
resid 
0.606  Schwarz criterion  -3.084 
Log likelihood 
 
391.884  F-statistic  95.757 
 
 
  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000 
Sample size is 247 
 
As a result, to study the effects of social relations on objective household economic welfare 
index, a fuzzy method was used. The fuzzy logic and the fuzzy set theory have been used in 
many disciplines since Zadeh’s pioneering contribution (1965). In economics, these tools have 
been applied since the nineties. The fuzzy set theory is useful in case the analysis regards some 
variables characterized by elements that can not be divided into clearly bounded groups. In 
particular: “A fuzzy set is a class of objects with a continuum of grades of membership. Such a 
set is characterized by a membership (characteristic) function which assigns to each object a 
grade of membership ranging between zero and one.” (Zadeh 1965, p.338). Let us assume that 
one wants to distinguish between the young and the old inside a group of individuals. What does 
“young” mean exactly? And “old”? The fuzzy set theory suggests the assignment of a “grade of 
membership” to each individual which is associated with the two different groups of the young 
and the old. In this case, the grades of membership characterize the individuals according to 
their age. A baby will have, for example, a very high grade of membership associated with the   10 
set of young and a very low grade of membership associated with the set of old. In this paper, 
the fuzzy logic and the related fuzzy set theory are useful to investigate the connections between 
the interpersonal relations and the objective household economic welfare. The application of 
these tools is justified by two reasons. One is the non linear relationship characterizing the 
analysis  presented  in  table  2.  The  fuzzy  method  allows  us  to  study  the  impact  of  each 
independent variable on the dependent one even if this effect is not linear. The second reason is 
the fuzzy character of the variable satisfaction. The categories associated to these variables, that 
are “not satisfied with the relationships with friends”, “not very satisfied”, “somewhat satisfied” 
and “very satisfied”, are the expression of qualitative judgments. It is possible to imagine that 
people having similar but not exactly equal degrees of satisfaction are included in the same 
category. The fuzzy method allows us to associate to each person a grade of membership in 
three alternative degrees of satisfaction: “low” “medium” and “high”. In this way, it is possible 
to better understand the qualitative character of this variable. In order to conduct the fuzzy 
analysis, each independent variable is partitioned into three fuzzy sets by grouping the “high”, 
“medium” and “low” values of the variables. A grade of membership in each of the three fuzzy 
sets is associated with each observation. The method used in this paper to generate the fuzzy 
sets and the grade of membership is that reported in Giles and Draeseke (2001)
8. Table 3 reports 
the results of the regression conducted using the tool of fuzzy logic. The regression presented in 
table 3 is a OLS regression in which each regressor is considered three times.  
Each time the single regressors are weighed by the grades of membership associated with 
the three different partitioned sets. The grades of membership are named with the letter U plus 
the name of the regressor and a number that reflects the fuzzy sets “high”, “medium” and “low”. 
For example, the grade of membership associated with the high set of values of the variable 
satisfaction  is  named  Usatisfaction1.  In  table  3,  specifically,  Constant,  Usatisfaction3  and 
Ueducation3 are constants; Membership, Satisfaction and Education are the regressors related to 
the  grade  of  membership  associated  with  the  medium  sets  of  values, 
Usatisfaction3*Satisfaction,  Ueducation1*education  and  Ueducation3*education  are  the 
regressors  weighed  by  the  grades  of  membership  in  the  high  (in  the  case  of 
Ueducation1*education)  or  low  (in  the  case  of  Usatisfaction3*Satisfaction  and 
Ueducation3*education) sets. The regression presented in table 3 is obtained by eliminating one 
after the other the non statistically significant regressors. Initially, the variables included in the 
regression  were  all  the  grade  of  membership  (that  are  constants)  and  the  three  variables 
Membership,  Satisfaction  and  Education  weighed  by  all  the  three  grades  of  membership 
















                                                
8 For a discussion about the fuzzy logic and the fuzzy set theory see: Zadeh (1965, 1987) and, from an 
economic perspective: Lindström (1998) and Giles and Draeseke (2001).   11 
 
Tab.3 Social relations and the objective economic welfare (Fuzzy logic) 
 
Dependent variable: the objective economic welfare index  
 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
Constant 
 
0.010  0.084  0.113  0.910 
Usatisfaction3 
 














0.443  0.093  4.748  0.000 
Satisfaction 
 




0.056  0.012  4.700  0.000 
Usatisfaction3*Satisfaction 
 
-0.227  0.059  -3.835  0.000 
Ueducation1*education 
 
-0.010  0.005  -1.955  0.052 
Ueducation3*education 
 
-0.073  0.025  -2.954  0.003 
R-squared 
 
0.647  Mean dependent var  0.489 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.635  S.D. dependent var  0.073 
S.E. of regression 
 
0.044  Akaike info criterion  -3.360 
Sum squared resid 
 
0.467  Schwarz criterion  -3.232 
Log likelihood 
 
423.941  F-statistic  54.411 
    Prob(F-statistic)  0.000 
Sample size is 247 
 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show, by considering the estimated coefficient obtained in table 3, the 










   12 
Fig.1 The effect of formal social participation  
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Fig.2 The effect of informal social participation  







2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
satisfaction
 
Fig.3 The effect of educational qualification  
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The  effect  of  the  variable  membership  on  the  objective  household  economic  welfare  is 
positive and linear (figure 1), the other two independent variables (satisfaction and education) 
seem to present a threshold effect. A greater satisfaction in relationships with friends and a 
higher level of education are associated with a greater level of objective household economic 
welfare, but this association is confirmed only until a specific value of these two independent 
variables.  In  particular,  a  growing  satisfaction  in  the  relations  with  friends  increases  the 
objective  household  economic  welfare  only  for  the  range  of  values of satisfaction  included 
between zero and about three (figure 2). Three is the value associated, in the questionnaire filled 
in by the heads of the families, with the assertion: “somewhat satisfied with relationships with 
friends”. This result suggests an essential consideration. When individuals reach a fairly high 
level of satisfaction in the relationships with friends, the channels by which the quality of social 
relations  can  promote  the  objective  household  economic  welfare  are  fully  exploited  by  the 
individuals.  An  individual  who  is  not  satisfied  or  has  a  low  level  of  satisfaction  with  the 
relationships  with  friends,  improving  the  quality  of  his  network  structure,  acquires  some 
advantages,  for  example  in  terms  of  possibility  to  obtain  information  by  other  agents,  and 
increases  the  possibility  of  reaching  a  higher  level  of  household  economic  welfare.  The 
transition from a situation in which individuals are somewhat satisfied with relationships with 
friends to a situation in which they are very satisfied does not appear to produce positive effects 
on the OEW. For this reason, we  can  assume that there is a threshold effect  related to the 
variable that captures the quality of social relations.  
A similar effect is associated with the variable education. The educational qualification is 
associated with a growing OEW but only until the value of educational qualification is equal to 
about four that is the value associated with the Junior high School (figure 3).  
To study the real presence of these two threshold effects that result in the fuzzy analysis, an 
OLS regression was conducted (table 4) in which two variables satisfaction and education are 
bounded according to the indications resulting in figures 2 and 3.  
 
Tab.4 Social relations and the objective economic welfare (bounded OLS) 
 
Dependent variable: the objective economic welfare index  
 










0.063  -1.437  0.152 
Membership 
 
0.417  0.092  4.546  0.000 
Satisfaction*(Satisfaction<=3.1)+(Satisfaction>3.1)*3.1 
 
0.110  0.024  4.509  0.000 
Education*(Education<=4.0)+(Education>4.0)*4.0  0.063  0.008  8.244  0.000 
R-squared  0.619  Mean dependent 
var 
0.489 
Adj. R-squared  0.614  S.D. dependent 
var 
0.0733 
S.E. of regression  0.046  Akaike info 
criterion 
-3.324 
Sum squared resid  0.504 
 
Schwarz criterion  -3.267 
Log likelihood  414.544  F-statistic  131.354 
    Prob(F-statistic)  0.000 
Sample size is 247   14 
The  threshold  effects  seem  to  be  effective  close  to  a  value  of  3.1,  for  the  variable 
satisfaction, and a value of 4 for the variable education. Compared to the regression in table 2, 
this bounded regression explains a higher percentage in the variation of the dependent variable 
(61.4% against 53.6%) and presents a lower standard error. Moreover, the Ramsey RESET test 
reveals that the relations estimated in this regression is correctly specified. It is thus interesting 
to calculate the precise effect of the two variables of social relations on the objective household 
economic welfare. In the equation presented in table 4, if membership were to increase by one 
standard deviation, the objective household economic welfare would increase by roughly 1.7%. 
If satisfaction were to increase by one standard deviation, the objective household economic 
welfare would increase by roughly 2.3%
9. A sensitivity analysis is presented in the next section.  
 
3.3 The sensitivity analysis with control variables on the OLS regressions 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis regarding the relationships between the 
social ties of the head of family and the level of the objective household economic welfare. 
 
Tab. 5 Social relations and the OEW: a sensitivity analysis (bounded OLS) 
Dependent variable: the objective economic welfare index 
Variables  included  in  the 
basic equation (Tab. 4) 
 






















































Standard error are shown in parentheses. The independent variables include educational qualification. 
Sample size is 247. ° Sample size is 209. Sample size is smaller when the variable Profession is included 
because  in  many  cases  the  answer  to  this  question  is  non  present  in  the  survey.  In  those  cases  the 
observation were deleted from the sample. 
                                                
9 This percentage is calculated by multiplying the standard deviation of the variable by his estimated 
coefficient.   15 
 
The  first  row  reports  the  coefficients  and  the  standard  errors  of  the  two  variables 
membership  and  satisfaction  as  they  are  shown  in  table  4.  The  following  rows  report  the 
coefficients  and  the  standard  errors  of  these  two  independent  variables  when  one  or  more 
control variables are introduced in the basic relation analysed in table 4. The control variables 
considered in the second and in the third row are two different dummies: the first one reflects 
the Italian regions (row 2) and the second one refers to the age of the head of the family (row 
3)
10.  The  introduction  of  the  cohort  dummies  allows  us  to  verify  that  the  positive  relation 
between the level of interpersonal relations and the objective household economic welfare is not 
merely  due  to  an  age  effect.  Both  the  regional  dummies  and  the  cohort  dummies  do  not 
eliminate the effects of the variables membership and satisfaction on the objective household 
economic welfare. The control variable employed (row 4) is a dummy assuming a value of 1 if 
the head of the family has a job, and value of 0 if he is unemployed
11. The variable profession 
(row 5) assumes three values: a value of 3 is associated with the jobs generating a potential 
“high income”, a value of 2 and a value of 1 are associated with the jobs with a potentially 
lower income
12. The variable source of income assumes a value of 1 or 0 depending on the main 
source of household income: if it is an income from work (value 1) or not (value 0)
13. The 
cohort  dummies  and  the  regional  dummies  are  considered  simultaneously  in  row  7.  The 
variables employed, profession and source of income are considered, at the same time, in row 8.  
The variables of social interactions membership and satisfaction are statistically significant 
in all the situation considered except when the cohort dummies and the regional dummies are 
introduced  at  the  same  time  and  only  in  regard  to  the  variable  satisfaction.  The  variable 
education, that is always considered in the estimations presented in table 5, is positively and 
statistically significant at least at the 5 percent in all the regressions except when the three 
control variables: employed, profession and source of income are considered at the same time 
(row 8). 
The sensitivity analysis seems to confirm that the participation in formal and informal social 
relations can increase the level of household economic welfare, and, in particular, this result is 
robust to the inclusion of a variety of control variables. The control variables analysed are also 
considered  in  the  study  of  relations  between  the  social  ties  and  the  subjective  household 




                                                
10 This dummy variable refers to four groups: the heads of the families who are from 23 to 37 years old, 
from 38 to 52 and from 53 and 67 and from 67 to 87. 
11 As described in section 2, the econometric analysis is conducted on values that represent an average 
value for a group of the heads of the families. The groups are derived by a grouping based on 19 regions 
and 13 age brackets. The cohort dummies and the region dummies are associated directly with the single 
groups.  Alternatively,  the  control  variables:  employed,  source  of  income  and  profession  are  initially 
referred  to  the  single  heads  of  the  families.  Subsequently,  for  these  variables,  the  group  means  are 
calculated as they are for the other independent variables. For this reason, the variable employed can 
assume  all  the  values  between  0  and  1.  The  value  0  represents  the  groups  in  which  everyone  is 
unemployed, the value 1 is associated with the groups where each individual has a job. Similarly, the 
variables source of income and profession, described below, assume values ranging respectively between 
1 and 3 and between 0 and 1. 
12  The  profession  associated  with  the  value  of  3  are:  executive,  middle-ranking,  entrepreneur,  self-
employed  person  and  professional,  value  of  2:  salaried  employee  and  foreman,  value  of  1:  manual 
worker, partner in a co-operative society and house worker. 
13  The  source  of  income  assuming  0  are:  pension,  benefit  payment,  estate  income  and  household 
maintenance,  the  source  of  income  assuming  1  are:  self-employment  income  and  income  from 
employment.   16 
 
Tab. 6 Social relations and the SEW: a sensitivity analysis (bounded OLS) 
 
Dependent variable: the subjective economic welfare index  
 
Variables  included  in  the 
basic equation (Tab. 1) 
 





















































Standard error are shown in parentheses. The independent variables include the Educational qualification. 
Sample size is 247. ° Sample size is 209. Sample size is smaller when the variable Profession is included 
because  in  many  cases  the  answer  to  this  question  is  non  present  in  the  survey.  In  those  cases  the 
observation were deleted from the sample. 
 
The  first  row  presents  the  coefficients  and  the  standard  errors  of  membership  and 
satisfaction  as  they  are  reported  in  table  1.  The  others  rows  show  the  coefficient  and  the 
standard errors of these two variables when the control variables are considered in the analysis. 
Table 6 shows that membership and satisfaction remain significant when the cohort dummies 
and the variables employed, profession and source of income are introduced in the regression. 
Membership  and  satisfaction  are  not  significant  if  the  region  dummies  are  considered.  The 
variable education, that is negatively correlated with the SEW in the analysis proposed in table 




Using Italian microdata, this paper investigates the association between the social structure 
of  personal  contacts  and  the  individual  economic  household  welfare.  Many  theoretical  and 
empirical studies have shown that social networks have a role in promoting positive economic 
outputs  (Granovetter  1974,  2005;  Helliwell  and  Putnam  1995;  Knack  and  Keefer  1997;   17 
Grootaert  1999;  Grootaert and Narayan 1999; Grootaert, Oh and  Swamy  1999;  Rose 1999; 
Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter 2000; Zak and Knack 2001; Lyon 2005; Granovetter 
2005). This paper has two main peculiarities with respect to the existing literature. First, the 
empirical  analysis  uses  a  very  ample  dataset  representative  of  the  entire  Italian  population. 
Second, it does not refer just to the density of social network, but it considers a proxy of the 
qualitative aspect of social structure. This distinction allows us to measure the effects of social 
relations on economic welfare by considering both the number and the intrinsic characteristic of 
the social relations of individuals. The quantitative aspect refers to the participation in voluntary 
associations. It is captured by the number of cultural, volunteer, ecological, human rights and 
peace associations the individuals participate in. The qualitative aspect concerns the satisfaction 
of agents in relations with friends. Individuals can take more advantage from the social network 
if this network is characterized by relations based on trust and trustworthiness. The satisfaction 
in relations with friends is a proxy of the quality concerning the network structure of personal 
contacts. The more one is satisfied with social relations, the more it is likely that these relations 
link  people  who  trust  each  other.  These  two  proxies  of  the  quantity  and  quality  of  social 
relations  have  been  analysed  with  regard  to  two  different  indices  of  household  economic 
welfare:  a  subjective  and  an  objective  economic  welfare  index.  The  subjective  household 
economic welfare has been constructed using: a) the responses of the head of the family about 
the general economic situation of the family and b) the responses of the head of the family about 
financial  difficulties  in  meeting  some  expenditures.  It  essentially  reveals  subjective 
considerations of the heads of families on the economic and financial situation of their families. 
The objective household economic welfare has been measured considering: a) the possession of 
some durable consumer goods and b) the characteristics of the physical structure of the house. It 
reflects objective elements concerning the economic welfare of families. The analysis shows 
that both these economic welfare indices are positively associated with the two proxies of social 
relations. The importance of both the qualitative and the quantitative aspect of social relations in 
the empirical analysis stresses that these aspects must be both explicitly considered in order to 
completely understand the effects of social network on economic performance. If we just look at 
the density of network structure of personal contacts we lose a relevant piece of information. 
This result raises interesting under-investigated questions. First, the interrelations between the 
quantity and the quality of the social relations of agents could be interestingly analysed. Are 
individuals connected to many people always more satisfied in interpersonal relations?  Second, 
this paper does not consider the factors that affect the formation of satisfying social relations. Is 
the satisfaction in social relation mostly related directly to the social skills of single agents or is 
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Appendix 1. Summary statistics 
 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. 
Deviation 











247  0.489  0.073  0.312  0.630 
Membership  247  0.055  0.040  0  0.217 
Satisfaction  247  3.068  0.206  2.242  3.583 
Education  247  3.949  0.900  2.091  5.583 













Profession  209  2.396  0.342  1  3 
 
Appendix  2.  Social  relations  and  household  economic  welfare:  the  discriminant 
analysis 
 
This appendix investigates, by using the discriminant analysis, the relationship between the 
household economic welfare and the quality and quantity of interpersonal relations of single 
agents. The discriminant analysis allows us to verify the robustness of the OLS results. The two 
household  economic  welfare  indices  considered  in  the  empirical  analysis  of  section  2  are 
continuous variables. They have been calculated by using the arithmetic mean. In this appendix 
a new aggregation method is proposed. With regard to each individual, the data obtained by the 
survey questions on the household economic welfare have been added. In this way we computed 
two new household economic welfare indices that are the sum of the values related to the survey 
questions and are categorical variables. As in section 2, different groups of the heads of the 
families (and of their relative household group) were created with regard to the age and the 
region of the heads of the families. There are 247 groups. The 247 groups were derived by a 
grouping based on 19 regions and 13 age brackets (the age brackets range 5 years and include 
the heads of families from 23 to 87 years old). The discriminant analysis with regard to both the   21 
objective  and  the  subjective  household  economic  welfare  index  is  conducted  on  these  247 
groups  considering,  for  each  group,  the  median  of  the  indices’  values  associated  to  the 
individuals that belong to the different groups. The new subjective economic welfare index 
presents only three different values, 19, 20 and 21, that are the sum of the values related to the 
survey questions used to compute this index. These values reflect a growing satisfaction of the 
head of the family with the welfare reached by the household. The new objective economic 
welfare index assumes thirteen values from 9 to 21. In order to have the same number of values 
in respect to the two indices, and in order to facilitate the interpretation of the discriminant 
analysis  results,  the  thirteen  values  of  the  new  objective  economic  welfare  index  were 
aggregated  in  three  classes  representing  household  with  a  high,  medium  and  low  objective 
economic welfare. The discriminant analysis was therefore conducted on the two new indices 
divided into three classes of household economic welfare.  
Section  1  shows  the  results  of  the  discriminant  analysis  referred  to  the  new  objective 
economic  welfare  index.  Section  2  presents  the  discriminant  analysis  related  to  the  new 
subjective economic welfare index. 
 
1. The discriminant analysis related to the objective economic welfare index 
 
Tables 1, 2and 3 present the results of the discriminant analysis with regard to the objective 
economic welfare index. 
 




Tab. 2 Structure Matrix and Classification function 
 
  Structure matrix  Classification function 











Constant      -182.366  -218.059  -219.906 
Membership  .518  .750(*)  -185.662  -182.361  -161.229 
Satisfaction  .639(*)  -.388  123.848  131.831  130.956 



















Df  Sig. 
1  1.714(a)  96.7  96.7  .795  .348  256.418  6  .000 
2  .059(a)  3.3  100.0  .235  .945  13.821  2  .001   22 
Tab. 3 Classification Results (b,c) 
 
Predicted Group Membership 
    
Objective 
economic 
welfare   Low  medium  high  Total 
Low  70  6  1  77 
Med.  12  60  36  108 
Count 
High  0  24  38  62 
Low  90.9  7.8  1.3  100.0 
Med.  11.1  55.6  33.3  100.0 
Original 
% 
High  .0  38.7  61.3  100.0 
Low  70  6  1  77 
Med.  12  60  36  108 
Count 
High  0  25  37  62 
Low  90.9  7.8  1.3  100.0 




High  .0  40.3  59.7  100.0 
(a) Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified 
by the functions derived from all cases other than that case. 
b 68.0% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
c 67.6% of cross-validated original grouped cases correctly classified. 
 
The first discriminant function explains 96.7% of the variance. The canonical correlation 
indicating the association between the groups and the groups centroid is high, in particular in 
regard to the first discriminant function. This result reveals a good discriminant strength of the 
functions that is confirmed by the Wilks’ Lambda Test. (Table 1)  
The structure matrix shows that all the three independent variables are positively correlated 
with the first function. The coefficients of the classification function are substantially consistent 
with the hypothesis that the quantity (membership) and quality (satisfaction) of social relations 
have  a  positive  effect  on  the  objective  household  economic  welfare.  In  particular,  the 
coefficients of the variable satisfaction show a behaviour that is similar to the threshold effect 
illustrated in section 4.2
14. (Table 2) 
Finally, table 3 shows that about the 68% of the cases are correctly classified
15.  
The discriminant analysis seems to confirm the effects that emerged in the OLS regressions, 
of the interpersonal relations on the objective household economic welfare.  
The  next  section  presents  the  discriminant  analysis  with  reference  to  the  subjective 
economic household index. 
                                                
14  See  the  coefficient  related  to  the  medium  and  the  high  objective  economic  welfare.  These  two 
coefficients are very similar, it is as if the variables satisfaction did not have any role in distinguishing the 
observations between the two groups: medium and high objective economic welfare. 
15 In this analysis, the Box’s M Test which tests the assumption of equality of covariances across groups 
is significant. In order to understand whether the results of the discriminant analysis are still consistent, a 
second analysis should be run using a separate-groups covariance matrix. If the results of the analysis 
conducted do not give radically different classification results, the first analysis can be accepted. In this 
case and in all the next discriminant analysis presented, the Box’s M Test is significant, but in all the 
cases considered, the classification results do not change if the analyses are conducted using a separate-
groups covariance matrix.   23 
2 The discriminant analysis related to the subjective economic welfare  
 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 show the results of the discriminant analysis with regard to the subjective 
economic household index. 
 
Tab. 4 Eigenvalue, Canonical Correlation and Wilks’Lambda 
 
 
Tab. 5 Structure Matrix and Classification function 
 
  Structure matrix  Classification function 












Constant      -139.070  -148.627  -156.509 
Membership  .836(*)  .184  -200.620  -190.066  -179.615 
Satisfaction  .890(*)  -.160  103.026  106.842  109.211 
Education  .654  .717(*)  -3.828  -4.348  -4.310 
 
Tab. 6 Classification Results (b,c) 
 
Predicted Group Membership 
    
Subjective 
economic 
welfare   low  medium  high  Total 
Low  1  0  1  2 
Med.  21  22  31  74 
Count 
High  24  34  113  171 
Low  50.0  .0  50.0  100.0 
Med.  28.4  29.7  41.9  100.0 
Original 
% 
High  14.0  19.9  66.1  100.0 
Low  0  1  1  2 
Med.  21  21  32  74 
Count 
High  24  34  113  171 
Low  .0  50.0  50.0  100.0 




High  14.0  19.9  66.1  100.0 
(a) Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified 
by the functions derived from all cases other than that case. 
b 55.1% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
c 54.3 % of cross-validated original grouped cases correctly classified. 
 








Df  Sig. 
1  .137(a)  99.2  99.2  .347  .878  31.501  6  .000 
2  .001(a)  .8  100.0  .034  .999  .278  2  .870   24 
99% of the variance explained by the model is due to the first discriminant function. The 
second function contributes little to the model. (Table 4). 
The two variables on social relations are positively correlated with the first function and 
their  coefficients  of  the  classification  function  assume  values  coherent  with  the  idea  that 
interpersonal relations can increase subjective household economic welfare. The effects of the 
educational  qualification  on  the  subjective  economic  welfare  are  not  easy  to  interpret 
considering  the  values  assumed  by  the  coefficients  of  the  classification  function  of  this 
variables
16. (Table 5) 
Finally, the percentage of cases correctly classified in this analysis is lower than in the 
similar analysis with reference to the objective economic welfare  (the 55.1% against the 68%). 
(Table 6) 
 
Appendix 3.  
A) The subjective household economic welfare index (SEW) 
 
The subjective household economic welfare index was elaborated by calculating the arithmetic 
mean of  two synthetic indices based on two types of information: 
 
1.  the responses of the head of family about the general economic situation of the family 
2.  the responses about financial difficulties to meet some expenditures. 
 
1. Responses about the general economic situation 
 
This index was obtained as an arithmetic mean of three variables
17: 
 
1.a Satisfaction about individual household economic welfare 
Very satisfied          = 4 
Somewhat satisfied        = 3 
Not very satisfied        = 2 
Not satisfied          = 1 
 
1.b Assesment regarding the economic resources of household members 
Very good          = 4 
  Satisfactory          = 3 
  Less than satisfactory        = 2 




                                                
16 In particular, the negative effect of educational qualification on subjective household economic welfare 
which is the most interesting result of the OLS regression conducted in section 4.1, is apparently not 
confirmed in this analysis. However, it should be considered that only two observations are included in 
the group with low household economic welfare. We tried to apply the discriminant analysis aggregating 
the three classes of this subjective household economic welfare index into just two classes with more 
observations. In this case, it is confirmed both the negative effect of educational qualification and the 
positive effect of the two variables membership and satisfaction on the subjective household economic 
welfare. 
17 The minimum value of these variables is always 1, but the maximum is different (4 or 5). For this 
reason,  in  order  to  assign  the same  weight  at  the  different  variables  it  was  necessary  to  compute  a 
standardization  that  equalizes  the  different  ranges.  The  value  of  the  single  observation  was  newly 
calculated according to the formula: (x-min)/(n-1), where x is the value of the single observation, min is 
the minimum value of the variable and n is the numbers of values that the variable can assume.    25 
1.c Household economic situation 
Very wealthy          = 5 
  Wealthy          = 4 
  Neither wealthy, nor poor      = 3 
  Poor            = 2 
  Very poor          = 1 
 
2. Responses about financial difficulties to meet some expenditures 
 
This index was obtained as an arithmetic mean of binary variables revealing the presence (value 
1) or the absence (value 2) of difficulties in order to realize some household expenses: 
 
Household expenses: Food, Clothes, Expenses for illness, Rent, Loan, Bills, School, Transports 
and Debts 
 
B) The objective household economic welfare index (OEW) 
 
The objective household economic welfare index was created by was elaborated by calculating 
the arithmetic mean of two synthetic indices based on two types of information 
 
1.  the possession of some durable consumer goods 
2.  the characteristics of wealth of house. 
 
1. Possession of some durable consumer goods 
 
This index was obtained as arithmetic mean of binary variables revealing the possession (value 
2) or not (value 1) of some durable consumer goods. 
 
durable consumer goods: Dishwasher, Washing machine, Video recorder, Video camera, Hi-Fi, 
Console (apart from the computer), Computer, Modem, Internet, Answerphone, Fax, Colour 
TV, Dish, Mobile telephone, Air conditioner, Bicycle, Scooter, Motorcycle and Car. 
 
2. Characteristics of wealth of house 
 
This index was obtained as an arithmetic mean of the following variables
18: 
 
1.a Number of rooms. 
A variable assuming a value of 1 if the house has a number of rooms higher than the mean of 
the variable and assuming a value of 0 if the house has a number of rooms lower than the mean 
 
1.b Bathroom 
  No Bathroom          = 1 
  One bathroom          = 2 
  Two bathrooms         = 3 
  More than two bathrooms      = 4 
 
1.c House expenses too high 
  No            = 2 
  Yes            = 1 
                                                
18 See note 17.    26 
1.d House in poor condition  
  No            = 2 
  Yes            = 1 
 
1.e 
  Homeowner          = 2 
  Not homeowner        = 1 
 
C) The independent variables 
 
The three more important independent variables introduced in the regressions are: 
 
1. Membership: the propensity to participation in “Putnam” associations 
 
Arithmetic mean of the following variables:  
 
Participation in cultural associations (in the last 12 months) 
Yes              1 
No              0 
Participation in voluntary organizations (in the last 12 months) 
Yes              1 
No              0 
 
Participation in ecological groups (in the last 12 months) 
Yes              1 
No              0 
 
2.Satisfaction: Satisfaction in the relations with friends 
 
Very satisfied            = 4 
Somewhat satisfied          = 3 
Not very satisfied          = 2 




  Phd              = 9 
  Master’s degree            = 8 
  Bachelor’s degree          = 7 
  Secondary-School certificate (4-5 Years)    = 6 
  Secondary-School certificate (2-3 Years)    = 5 
  Junior high School (from age 11 to 14)      = 4 
  Primary School           = 3 
  No title (literate)          = 2 
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